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Prepared by: Gordon Lederman	
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Participants – non-Commission:	*.
Participants - Commission: Kevin Scheid, Gordon Lederman	
(U) BACKGROUND.	
is an analyst in CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI)	<u>.</u>

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(S) He then became Chief of the DI's Human Resources office for 19 months, whe	re he
was during 9/11.	
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He said that the DI has three main offi	ces -
NESA, REA (Russia and Europe) and APLA.	
(U) THE CIA'S USE OF CENTERS.	
(S) When he came to the NPC, he found it to be a very troubled office. He turned it	it.
around and became known for liking career management issues – unlike other man	
in the DI. Hence, he was assigned to the DI's office of human resources.	12"
(U) THE TRADECRAFT OF ANALYSIS, THE BALANCE BETWEEN LONG-	FERM
AND SHORT-TERM ANALYSIS, AND THE INTELLIGENCE/POLICY NEXU	
AND SHORT-TERM ANALYSIS, AND THE INTELLIGENCE/FOLICT NEAD	<u>v.</u>
(S) Tradecraft of analysis has improved remarkably from where it was in 1980 - in	
in 1980 the CIA's analysis tradecraft was where is today. In	
the DI initiated all of its production and had little contact with its customers. There	e was
very little feedback from customers to the DI. The DI focused on long-term papers	
customers had no time to read the papers. When Robert Gates was appointed as De	enuty
Districts that no time to feat the papers. When revolute and the DI reals and file by call	ina on
Director of the CIA for Intelligence (DDI), he irritated the DI rank-and-file by call	ing an
all-hands meeting and telling them that the DI's work was not useful to policymake	
Gates criticized the DI for not giving any evidence for its judgments and not provide	
sources for its facts. Gates insisted on sourcing - the origin of the information, how	N
reliable the source is, how confident the DI is in the information's validity, etc. Ga	ites
also reviewed all of the DI's long papers.	
also leviewed all of the Di s long papers.	
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(S) The connection to policymakers did not come until the late 1990's. McLaughli	
a leader in making that connection - he did outreach to policymakers. McLaughlir	ı was
very close with Bob Blackwill at the National Security Council (NSC). Having an	
involved in policymaking benefits both the analysts and the policymakers. The CI	A was
sitting at the policymaking toble in the 1000s, indeed the DCI is player in	
sitting at the policymaking table in the 1990s – indeed, the DCI is player in	
policymaking. Accordingly, more effort was needed in the DI to support the needs	or the

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DDI, the DDCI, and the DCI for their involvement in policymaking circles. Analysts in

the DI had a difficult time adjusting to this change.

(S) Of course, long-term research is needed in order for analysts to be prepared for crises. The DI has swung between extremes. Before Gates, there was a heavy emphasis on analysts' long-term research programs, and each analyst had to draft two papers per year. The DI produced a formal research plan that was submitted to Congress, perhaps to justify the DI's budget request and as an effort to keep track of the DI's work. Then, during the 1990s, there was better coordination between the DI and customers, so the balance shifted to the DI being responsive to policymakers – long-term research was ignored. When McLaughlin became DDI, he argued that the DI needed to do more long-term research, so he established the Strategic Perspective Series for long-term papers done in consultation with customers. The Strategic Perspective Series is a DI effort implied that the National Security Agency (NSA) is not consulted.
said that he learned from experience that working with other agencies "is a good thing" because they have other information that the DI needs. had a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) taskings officer, and the task force coordinated its research plan with DIA. Also, NPC's analysts met with the DIA regularly to deconflict and minimize duplication. There was an analysis strategy for NPC. The APLA office has the "problem of global coverage" – the DI is expected to be able to answer questions about any country, so the DI needs to work with other agencies and perhaps divide the effort, particularly regarding Third World countries.
never had any interactions with the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence (ADCI) for Analysis and Production.
(S) "Alternative analysis" is also important – Gates gave a big push on sourcing and relevance, and the next DDI, Doug MacEachin, developed Tradecraft 2000 and forced every analyst and manager to learn about tradecraft. Alternative analysis involves looking at possible alternative explanations, examining the evidence, ascertaining what is unknown, and deciding how the unknowns affect the possible results. (One way an alternative analysis can be conducted is via a red cell, which was instituted post-9/11 and which examines such questions as
There was no talk of denial and deception in the 1980s, but it is a
significant issue today – due to the Jeremiah report on the Indian nuclear tests. As an aside, he noted that in the mid-1990s there were probably
AD THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE

(S) The DI supports the National Intelligence Council (NIC) by providing drafters for NIEs, coordinating NIEs, and providing analysts to serve as National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) and Assistant NIOs on the NIC. He does not think that the NIC is disconnected from the DI.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL.

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(U) WARNING, AND THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE'S RELATIONSHIP
WITH OTHER PARTS OF THE CIA.
THE O 4 1 1000 NHE
(S) The October 1990 NIE
on Yugoslavia predicted that Yugoslavia would fall apart and that there was nothing that the U.S. could do about it. I noted that when the Intelligence Community
the U.S. could do about itnoted that when the Intelligence Community (IC) produces an NIE that states that something bad will happen, the IC needs to start
gearing-up its collectors – but no one wanted to hear about Yugoslavia imploding. Gulf
War I then intervened. Yugoslavia was a classic analytic case of (1) people not wanting
to hear about an impending problem, and (2) people who had influence downplayed the
impending problem.
(S) There used to be a split between the DI and the Directorate of Operations (DO), but
now there is very intimate contact between them.
now there is very intimate contact between them.
More generally, the DO will consult with the DI before putting-to information
that the DO is unsure about. When he was in the NPC, he felt that the DO was not
-with adding any information from NPC's analysts
withholding any information from NPC's analysts.
withholding any information from NPC's analysts.
(S) There are CIA teams serving at NSA. Analysts now have much greater awareness of
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(U) THE TRADECRAFT OF ANALYSIS AND TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES.
suggested that the tradecraft of analysis for transnational issues does not differ much from state-oriented analysis, although analyzing transnational issues does require making more linkages and using databases. The balance is shifting in favor of transnational issues – for example, in nonproliferation there used to be only a few countries on which to focus, but today there are many actors involved.
(S) When he came to NPC, he worked on parts of a strategy for analysis, which was focused on bioweapons. Now, the nonproliferation area is so fast-paced, with people constantly being redeployed, that it is much harder to do a strategy. Today, analysts are being directed to different accounts quickly – they often have little warning about it. In response to a question from Mr. Scheid, said he did not know whether the centers are a transitional step to another type of organizational structure – he said that the regional offices cannot be eliminated because some issues will be state-centric.
(S) Initially, there was no association between terrorism and counterproliferation – the main proliferation concern was states. Now, there is much more concern about terrorism and WMD.
(S) More generally, he said that the IC needs to be brought closer together, such as he did
(S) Regarding barriers to information-sharing, he said that agencies have different approaches to foreign contacts – in the Defense Department, for example, foreigners do not need to be escorted in the building. Also, communications systems among agencies need to be established. ICEmail exists, but CIA has little contact with it. Issues of communications include connectivity, the fact that managers in each agency are not evaluated based no how well they promote IC cooperation, and people throughout the IC do not know what more they could be doing if there was close intra-IC cooperation.
(U) Regarding the issue of global coverage, said that the reality is that the IC cannot respond to a question from the President by saying that the IC does not cover that particular country because it is not a priority. said that analysts criticize their managers for never refusing a tasking even if that tasking is not a priority for the office.
(U) Requirements are set by (1) doing briefings for other agencies, after which the agencies ask follow-up questions; (2) Congressional briefings – Congress is a major customer, which is a big change for the IC; (3) NSC taskings; and (4) briefings for support for military operations. He noted that at NPC he spent a lot of time briefing

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Congress and responding to Congressional questions (including "CDAs" and "hotspot briefings").

(U) MANAGEMENT.

- (S) THE DI is very people-oriented, and most of its budget is for personnel. Some offices are more capital-intensive, such as WINPAC letting contracts for research and development concerning technical issues. As an aside, he said that the Counterintelligence Center had a career track. He thought that CTC's Office of Terrorist Analysis had kept the regular DI career track.
- (U) Regarding the proposal for having analysts track their work on an hourly basis, he first misunderstood the proposal as based on the belief that the analysts were shirking their responsibilities. He noted that there have been some surveys of overtime and stress on the DI workforce. However, as he noted, the DI has no way of knowing how much time is spent on Congressional briefings or any other task.